Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. (TEPCO) Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata (L) is seen beside the company officials during a news conference at the company head office in Tokyo April 17, 2011. Japanese nuclear power plant operator TEPCO hopes it will be able to achieve cold shutdown of its crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant within six to nine months, the company said on Sunday. Katsumata said he was considering resigning over the accident, but that he couldn't say when. REUTERS / Issei Kato / totallycoolpix.com

By Hidenori Tsuboya and Jin Nishikawa
9 June 2011 The Japanese government’s report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant catalogues multiple failures at all levels of Japan’s nuclear industry, bureaucracy and government. The report, submitted June 7, lists 28 challenges thrown up by the disaster at the Fukushima plant. Japan’s nuclear establishment was found wanting in the facilities and equipment it had in place at the stricken plant, in its systems for regulating the nuclear industry and handling a nuclear accident, and in its actual response to the nuclear crisis triggered by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. The report stresses that plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) had not properly prepared for the disaster. Problems went further than a loss of power in the plant following the quake and tsunami. There were also flaws in the reactors themselves and problems with peripheral equipment. Fundamentally, the report concludes, TEPCO had not prepared sufficiently for the scale of the tsunami seen on March 11 and its assessment of the likelihood of waves on that scale was incorrect. … The report details a series of mistakes by the government and TEPCO in their handling of the developing crisis at Fukushima. … There were problems with the valves for lowering pressure inside the reactors, which are vital to preventing ruptures in the reactors’ pressure and containment vessels. Workers took too long to open the valves and some reactors shared outlet pipes, further complicating the process and leading to the escalation of the disaster. Dosimeters provided to individual workers to help protect themselves from excessive radiation exposure broke because they were submerged in the tsunami, increasing risks for the response teams. There were other fundamental problems with the layout and design of the plant, according to the report. The location of fuel storage pools on the upper floors of the reactor buildings complicated the response to the accident, making it harder to inject water into the pools. The arrangement of key buildings also helped the spread of contamination, with radioactive water spilling into the turbine buildings from the reactor buildings. … The report also admits failures in communications with the communities near the plant and with foreign nations offering assistance. … The authors also note that the government failed to clearly set out how the crisis was developing to the public and how it might develop, leading to increased public concern. The report calls for greater clarity in public announcements, setting out in easy to understand ways the real dangers to people’s health from radiation. …

FUKUSHIMA LESSONS: Government admits failures in Fukushima crisis