Fred Bartlit Jr., chief investigator of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, talks about the blowout preventer at a presentation in November, 2010. The Associated PressPublished: Thursday, February 17, 2011, 11:05 PM
By David Hammer, The Times-Picayune

New evidence unearthed by investigators shows that in some key moments before the Deepwater Horizon exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, BP leaders were disengaged from critical tests and recognized major problems, but they failed to communicate their concerns or take corrective action. The causes of the BP disaster have been picked over by several investigative bodies for months, including the national Oil Spill Commission and its lead counsel, Fred Bartlit Jr. But a 371-page supplementary report released by Bartlit on Thursday pulls back the curtain even further on what actually went wrong. “In clear, precise, and unflinching detail, this report lays out the confusion, lack of communication, disorganization, and inattention to crucial safety issues and test results that led to the deaths of 11 men and the largest offshore oil spill in our nation’s history,” said the commission’s co-chairmen, former Sen. and Gov. Bob Graham of Florida and former Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly. The commission presented its final report to Congress on Jan. 11, but Bartlit continued to gather new details and responses to previously unanswered questions, resulting in Thursday’s report. The Justice Department is considering possible criminal charges and might seek to increase civil pollution fines if it determines the spill was the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct, so the greater detail could prove to be significant evidence. For example, during what might have been the most important test of the Macondo well’s ability to withstand a blowout — the negative pressure test run just hours before the actual accident — the top BP man on the Deepwater Horizon rig attributed disturbing pressure readings to a purported force called the “bladder effect,” something most scientists consider a myth. When Bob Kaluza defended his interpretation of the pressure readings in an internal e-mail after the accident, Patrick O’Bryan, a BP vice president who was visiting the rig when the test was being conducted, reacted by sending his own e-mail to a colleague: a string of about 400 question marks. Bartlit’s report alleges that Kaluza broke with industry practice by not being present on the rig floor for important parts of the test and by failing to approve a viscous fluid that was used in the test. The fluid, called “spacer,” was used at double the normal quantity, and investigators think it might have erroneously produced reassuring readings during part of the negative pressure test. “Had he been on the rig floor and participating in the test the entire time, Kaluza would have been in a better position to observe several anomalies,” Bartlit’s report states. After the accident, Kaluza refused to testify before federal investigators, invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Kaluza’s defense attorney, former federal prosecutor Shaun Clarke, declined to comment. …

BP knew of problems, but left them unattended before Gulf oil well blowout, new report says